Our tendency to set different burdens of proof according to whether evidence

Gilovich’s two questions expose the unequal test: “Can I believe this?” for welcome evidence and “Must I believe this?” for evidence that hurts.

“Can I believe this?” needs one plausible route. “Must I believe this?” demands that every escape be bricked up. We call both processes critical thinking and somehow never notice the border policy. A positive test runs for a week and becomes momentum. A negative test needs another quarter. Praise is candid; criticism is “context-dependent”. The favourable forecast is repeated at full volume while the opposing case receives a forensic audit of every footnote. Scepticism remains valuable. Selective scepticism is preference armed with footnotes.

The ugliest version is procedural. A pet idea gets a friendly pilot, a forgiving metric and permission to explain failure. Its rival must arrive with peer review, perfect attribution and a signed confession from God. Both are then described as having faced “the same process”. This is bullshit with stationery.

Set the burden before the result. How much evidence changes the plan? Would the same threshold survive if the direction reversed? Which source remains credible when it says the irritating thing? Put the two evidential thresholds side by side before anyone knows which result will benefit. Keep those answers visible while enthusiasm and fear start negotiating exemptions. The preferred proposal may still win under a consistent threshold. The difference is that any exemption will be visible before somebody describes two unequal tests as “the same process”.