session of the ball and run a swift counterattack. Yau quickly progress i Saat the field toward the opposing goal. Right outside the penalty area, vou are facing an important decision. You can maneuver your way amuns the remaining two defenders and try to score yourself-say that you’ll have a 40 percent probability of success. Or you can pass the ball to your teamnate Paul Pogba, who has an open position fifteen yards out-say that you i believe he’ll have a 60 percent probability of success. What would you do? From the team’s perspective, the latter option is dearly preferable, as it’s more likely to score a goal. Why would Sanchez hesitate to pass the ball to Pogba, though? If all incentives were based on the team’s success, it would be an easy choice. However, this is not the case. Sanchez, the highest earner at Manchester United at the time, had a bonus clause in his contract that would earn him an additional GBP75,000 for every goal and GBP20,000 for every assist.” This type of individual incentive creates a trade-off between a team’s overall success and a player’s own compensation. In the player’s case, even though passing the ball is more beneficial for the cam, a shooting attempt could be much more lucrative given the disparity between goal and assist bonuses. To illustrate Sanchez’s perspective more clearly, his decision process is plotted in the game tree and shown in the illustration on the next page.
